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POLISHING THE TARNISHED SILVER PLATTER
DOCTRINE: THE EFFECT OF JANIS v. UNITED
STATES ON INTERSOVEREIGN FOURTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since at least 1914, evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of the fourth amendment1 has been held inadmissible in a federal

criminal prosecution.2 This exclusionary rule, although generally appli-

cable where the federal government alone is involved, has been expand-

ed and contracted by the United States Supreme Court under various
circumstances where state officers are involved. The picture has been
further complicated by the fact that in Weeks v. United States,3 the very
case which established the federal rule, intersovereign violations of the
fourth amendment were exempted from the operation of the rule.4 In
other words, if a state or local law enforcement official seized evidence
in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights, federal officials
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or things to be
seized.
2. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). As used in this comment,
the term "inadmissible" will refer to evidence which is inadmissible in the prosecution's
case in chief. It is the general rule that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's
fourth amendment rights may be used at the criminal trial for purposes of impeaching
the credibility of the defendant, if he chooses to take the stand. See, e.g., Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). For
extensive commentary on the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes, see Dershowitz and Ely, Harris v .New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198
(1971); Note, Impeachment by Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence: The Rule of
Harris v. New York, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 441; Cole, Impeaching With Unconstitutionally
Obtained Evidence: Some Reflections on the Palatable Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 18
DE PAUL L. Rav. 25 (1968); Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule, 34 U. CL L. Rav. 939 (1967).
3. 232U.S. 383 (1914).

4. Id, at 398.
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could use the evidence against the defendant in a federal criminal
proceeding. 5
The judicially-sanctioned use of such evidence was termed the
"silver platter" doctrine6 and, with certain exceptions, 7 was in force for
some forty-seven years. In 1960, however, in Elkins v. United States,8

the Supreme Court overruled Weeks' silver platter exemptionY

After

Elkins, a citizen could feel reasonably confident that he would be free

from federal criminal prosecution based on the fruits of an unreasonable
search and seizure, regardless of whether the evidence was seized by

federal or state officials. This confidence has waned considerably as a
result of the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Janis.10
The Janis case provided the Court with an opportunity to reexam-

ine the silver platter doctrine in an ostensibly civil, but actually quasicriminal context.11 Janis grew out of a November, 1968 incident when
a Los Angeles police officer swore out an affidavit based upon information from a purportedly reliable informant, and obtained a warrant from
the Los Angeles Municipal Court for the search of certain premises and

of respondent Janis. Pursuant to this warrant, city police seized certain
wagering records and a quantity of cash, and arrested respondent. The

city police then notified the Internal Revenue Service of respondent's
alleged bookmaking activities and the IRS, relying solely on an examination of the evidence seized by the city police, assessed respondent

wagering excise taxes in the amountof $89,026.09, plus interest. Res5. The general term "intersovereign" can refer to the opposite situation as well;
i.e., where federal authorities obtain evidence in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights, and then turn that evidence over to state authorities for use in state proceedings. This comment will not deal with that aspect of intersovereiga violations of the
fourth amendment. For comment on this situation, see Garfinkel, Although a Federal
Suppression Order Has Been Granted,Federal Officials Are Not ProhibitedFrom Transferring Evidence to State Authorities; However, Federal Authorities Are Prohibited
From Testifying in State Proceedings, 8 HOUSTON L. Rtv. 371 (1970). There seems
to be little doubt that the exclusionary rule is wholly inapplicable where a foreign government or a private party violates the defendant's fourth amendment rights. See, e.g.,
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517
(5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Stonehili, 274 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1967), af!'d,
405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969). See generally Note,
Searches South of the Border: Admission of Evidence Seized by Foreign Officials, 53
CORNELL L Rav. 886 (1968); Note, Mapp v. Ohio and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally
Obtained by PrivateParties,72 YALE L.J. 1062 (1963).
6. The phrase "silver platter" was first turned by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Lustig
v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949).
7. See notes 30-36 infra and accompanying text.
8. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
9. Id. at 223.
10. 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976).
11. See notes 81-112 infra and accompanying text.
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pondent was subsequently criminally charged in the Los Angeles Municipal Court with violations of the local gambling laws. He moved to
quash the warrant on the basis of Spinelli v. United States.12 The trial

judge granted the motion to quash,13 ordering all items seized pursuant
to the warrant to be returned, with the exception of the cash which had

been levied on by the IRS in partial satisfaction of the assessment.
Respondent then filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California seeking a refund of the money. The

district court held that the affidavit was insufficient to support a finding
of probable cause.'" The court ordered the money refunded to Janis
because the evidence used by the IRS in calculating the assessment was

obtained in violation of respondent's fourth amendment rights.

The

government's counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice, and the Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed by unpublished memorandum
opinion.

The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted the

government's petition for certiorari.' 5
The major issue presented in Janiswas whether evidence seized by

state or local law enforcement officials in good faith,'" but nevertheless
unconstitutionally, 17 is admissible in a civil tax proceeding, to which
12. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In Spinelli and an earlier decision in Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964), the Supreme Court established specific guidelines for determining
whether a search warrant based on information obtained from an informant has been
properly issued. These guidelines consist of a two-pronged test which states that (1)
the application for the warrant must set forth enough of the underlying circumstances
to enable the magistrate independently to judge the validity of the informant's conclusion
that illegal activity was indeed occurring, and (2) the affiant must support the claim
that the informant is "credible" and "reliable" by stating the information from which
he drew these conclusions. Spinelli reaffirmed Aguilar in quashing a warrant where
neither prong of the test was met. 393 U.S. at 415-16.
For an exception to the second prong of the Spinelli-Aguilar test, see Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1958). Draper was also reaffirmed by Spinelli. Accord,
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300
(1967). See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Nathanson v. United States, 290
U.S. 41 (1933).
13. In granting the motion, the judge held that the affidavit did not set forth in
sufficient detail the underlying circumstances to enable the warrant-issuing state court
to determine independently the reliability of the informant's information. 96 S. Ct.
at 3024.
14. 96 S. Ct. at 3025.
15. 421 U.S. 1010 (1975).
16. "Good faith," as used by the Court in this context, refers to good faith reliance
by the police on a defective search warrant. For further comment on this issue, see
notes 113-135 infra and accompanying text.
17. As used in this comment, "unconstitutionally" indicates that there was a violation of the fourth amendment. The question of evidence obtained in violation of the
fifth amendment will not be dealt with in this comment.
18. See note 109 infra and accompanying text. Janis involved a tax refund suit
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the United States is a party.19 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit and held the evidence admissible; yet the specific factual consid-

erations which influenced the decision are at best unclear. Avoiding
significant reliance on the fact that the fourth amendment violations by
the police had been committed in good faith, the Court seemed more
concerned with the type of litigation and the jurisdiction of the police

officers involved: "[The judicially created exclusionary rule should not
be extended to forbid the use in the civil proceeding of one sovereign of
evidence seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign. ' 20 The basic rationale behind the Janis holding is that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy, serving the purpose of

deterring unconstitutional police conduct, and is not mandated by the
language of the fourth amendment. 2 '

This comment will critically analyze the theoretical and practical
implications of Janis and the effect of these implications on future
applications of the exclusionary rule. The discussion will initially trace

the development of the various rationales for the exclusionary rule and
how they have been utilized both to support and reject the silver platter
doctrine. Finally, this development will be placed in the context of the
Janis decision in an attempt to identify the factors which led to the
admission of the tainted evidence in Janis.
I.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF INTERSOVEREIGN FOURTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS

The seminal case in the silver platter area is the 1914 case of
and a counterclaim by the IRS for a substantial amount of unpaid wagering taxes. The
majority in Janis treated this situation as a civil action, but in his dissent Mr. Justice
Stewart pointed out:
These provisions, constituting an "interrelated statutory scheme for taxing
wagers," Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 42, operate in an area "permeated with criminal statutes," and impose liability on a group "inherently
suspect of criminal activities." Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 79, quoted
in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. at 47. . . . The wagering provisions
are not merely to raise revenue, but also to assist "the efforts of state and
federal authorities to enforce [criminal] penalties" for unlawful activities.
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. at 47.
19. 96 S.Ct. at 3023. The Court also considered the issue of the burden of proof
in a federal tax assessment. The majority assumed, without deciding, that the burden
of proof lies with the taxpayer to demonstrate the incorrectness of an assessment. The
Court also assumed without deciding that in the case of an assessment which is totally
without foundation (such as an assessment based wholly on evidence which must be
excluded) the burden of proof shifts to the government. 96 S. Ct. at 3026.
20. 96 S. Ct. at 3035. The language used by the Court in framing this holding
would seem to apply to the federal-to-state situation (the "reverse silver platter") as
well. See note 5 supra. Of course, it is arguable that Janis should be read to apply
only in the state-to-federal situation, as that is the factual context of the case.
21. 96 S.Ct. at 3028.
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Weeks v. United States.22 Local police officers entered the defendant's
house without a search warrant, seizing various items which were later
transferred to a United States Marshal. The police and marshal returned shortly thereafter, made a further warrantless search and seized
additional material. The evidence resulting from these searches was
subsequently used by the federal government in convicting the defendant of violating a federal criminal statute. 23 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the conviction rested upon illegally
obtained evidence and the federal marshal had been involved in the
second search. The Court then enunciated the exclusionary rule: evidence obtained by federal officials in violation of the fourth amendment
is inadmissible in a federal criminal proceeding.24 The effect of the
Federal rule prohibited the admission of the evidence illegally obtained
by the federal officer in the second search.
The Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule to the intersovereign area, however, apparently on the theory that the fourth amendment
applied only to the federal government.2 5 With regard to the first
search in Weeks, the Court held that evidence obtained solely by state
26
officials was admissible in a federal criminal proceeding.
Despite the conceptually diverse rulings in Weeks, the language on
which the federal rule was based seemed sufficiently broad to include
intersovereign constitutional violations when they existed:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of this
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures
. . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts
which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right
to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.
. . . The efforts of the courts and their officials to
bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are,
22. 232U.S. 383 (1914).

23. The defendant was charged with using the mails for the purpose of conducting
a lottery or gift enterprise. See 35 Stat. 1129 (1909).
24. 232 U.S. at 398.
25. Id. at 391-92.

See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

26. 232 U.S. at 398. The intersovereign distinction in Weeks provided the basis
for the silver platter doctrine in the federal courts. As Justice Frankfurter later stated
in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949): "The crux of the doctrine is
that a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search
by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal
authorities on a silver platter." See Annot., 24 A.L.R. 1408, 1424 (1923) and supplementing annotations for a collection of the major cases following the Weeks doctrine.
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are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles

established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted
in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
27
land.

Thus the Court in Weeks established general principles of judicial
integrity as the primary basis for the exclusionary rule; the federal courts

must not be accomplices to violations of the Federal Constitution.28
The real issue left unresolved by Weeks was whether these principles

were constitutionally mandated, a question going to the very origins of
the exclusionary rule.29
As a result of the intersovereign-intrasovereign distinction in
Weeks, the silver platter doctrine essentially amounted to a loophole in

the exclusionary rule, often resulting in collusion between state and
federal law enforcement officials to obtain convictions with evidence
seized in violation of the fourth amendment.3 0 The Supreme Court
recognized the existence of this collusive activity in Byars v. United
States 1 and attempted to correct the problem by holding that evidence

obtained illegally must be excluded in federal criminal trials if there was
27. 232 U.S. at 392-93.
28. Id. The emphasis on principles of judicial integrity as the historical foundation
for the exclusionary rule was further delineated in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), where he argued that
"in order to preserve the judicial process from contamination," courts should not participate in the fruits of constitutional violations. Id. at 484. Describing the need for
respect for the American governmental system and the enforcement of its laws, Justice
Brandeis stated at length:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall
be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen.
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if
it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker,
it breeds contempt for law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself;
it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
Id. at 485. See also McNabb v. United States, 3.18 U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
29. To the extent that the principles of judicial integrity found in Weeks were constitutionally mandated, the exclusionary rule should apply by that same authority where
either state or federal officials violate the Federal Constitution. Perhaps more importantly, a constitutional foundation would preclude Congressional or judicial erosion of
the exclusionary rule. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1943).
30. See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 8 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1925); Flagg v. United
States, 233 F. 481 (2d Cir. 1916); United States v. Brown, 8 F.2d 630 (D. Ore. 1925);
United States v. Falloco, 277 F. 75, 82 (W.D. Mo. 1922); United States v. Slusser,
270 F. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1921).
31. 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
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overt participation by federal officials in the search and seizure. 3 2
33
The Byars doctrine was extended in Gambino v. United States,

wherein state officials illegally seized liquor from the defendant's automobile. The evidence was subsequently admitted in a federal criminal
proceeding against the defendant and he was convicted of violating the
National Prohibition Act.34 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the conviction on the ground that the state officials had no
reason to believe that the defendant had violated any state law at the
time of the search and seizure.35 Although the state officers were not

acting pursuant to any known agreement with federal officers, the
illegally seized evidence had relevance only in proving a federal crime.

As a result, the Court found that the state officers "believed they were
required by law to aid in enforcing the National Prohibition Act; and
that they made this arrest, search and seizure. . . solely for the purpose
of aiding in the federal prosecution. '3 6 Thus, to prevent the possible
circumvention of the overt participation doctrine in Byars through covert federal directions to state agents, the Court in Gambino established a
"constructive federal participation" doctrine in circumstances where

illegally seized evidence had no relevance to a state crime.
The restrictions on the silver platter doctrine in Byars and Gambi-

no, coupled with the basic Weeks rationale, subsequently led to conflicts
and inconsistencies among the circuits.3 7 By 1949, however, certain
basic principles had emerged and were consistently followed: (1) evidence unconstitutionally obtained by federal officials was inadmissible
in a federal criminal proceeding under the Weeks federal rule; (2)
32. Id. at 33. The Byars "overt participation" doctrine was actually an extension
of Weeks since without such participation by federal officers, there could be no fourth
amendment objection to illegal searches and seizures by state officers. Later, in Lustig
v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), the Court further refined the concept of overt
federal participation:
The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars case is the
actuality of a share by a federal officer in the total enterprise of securing
and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means. It is immaterial
whether a federal agent originated the idea or joined in it while the search
was in progress. So long as he was in it before the object of the search was
completely accomplished, he must be deemed to have participated in it.
Id. at 79.
33. 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
34. 41 Stat. 305 (1919).
35. 275 U.S. at 314.
36. Id. at 315.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1946); Kitt v. United
States, 1,32 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1942); Ward v. United States, 96 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.
1938); Sutherland v. United States, 92 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1937); Sloane v. United
States, 47 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1931).
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evidence obtained illegally by state or local officials with overt federal
participation was inadmissible in federal criminal trials, pursuant to
Byars; and (3) evidence obtained illegally by nonfederal officials was
admissible in all federal proceedings, absent the constructive federal
participation in Gambino."8
In 1949, Wolf v. United States3 9 directed a major shift of emphasis
in the fourth amendment area which adversely affected both the exclusionary rule and the silver platter doctrine. Wolf was an intrasovereign
situation; the defendant was convicted in state court upon evidence
illegally obtained by state officers. The Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction; holding for the first time that fourth amendment provisions
against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.4" However, the
Court refused to apply the federal exclusionary rule to the states, ruling
that the admission of evidence in state courts that had been unconstitutionally obtained by state officers was not reversible error. In effect, the
Court viewed adoption of the exclusionary rule as a matter for each state
to decide for itself. 4
The Wolf decision supported the federal intrasovereign rule in
Weeks but failed to take the critical step of requiring the states to adopt
the federal exclusionary remedy. This result was achieved by a doctrinal shift by the Court which, although almost unnoticed at the time,
relegated the principles of judicial integrity in Weeks to something less
than constitutional status. To the extent that Weeks characterized these
principles as implicitly mandated by the fourth amendment, the Wolf
Court disclaimed this foundation for the exclusionary rule in no uncertain terms: "[The exclusionary rule] was not derived from the explicit
requirements of the Fourth Amendment; it was not based on legislation
expressing Congressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution.
' '42
The decision was a matter of judicial implication.
38. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1960). As noted previously,
this comment will not deal with the admissibility in state proceedings of evidence illegally obtained by federal authorities. In 1949 there was a split of authority among
the states on this point. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33-40 (1949). See also
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1960) (Table depicting state exclusionary
rules pre-Weeks, pre-Wolf, and post-Wolf).

39. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
40. Id. at 28.
41. Id. at 31. Although Wolf left the states free to adopt alternatives to the exclusionary rule, the states were nevertheless required to accord criminal defendants minimum requirements of due process. Compare Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.. 128 (1954)
with Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1953).
42. 338 U.S. at 28.
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Whether the doctrinal shift in Wolf affected the status of the silver
platter doctrine remained to be fully articulated. Since Wolf disclaimed

any fourth amendment basis for the exclusionary rule, the federal courts
were left virtually free, subject to minimum requirements of due process
and Congressional intervention, to scrutinize the bases and purposes of
the rule through general policy analysis. Although this analysis in Wolf
seemed to focus on the deterrence of future violations of the fourth
amendment, 43 the decision did not purport to vitiate the principles of
judicial integrity on which the federal exclusionary rule in Weeks was
based. Instead, the Weeks rationale appeared to remain viable solely in

its application to the federal courts. After Wolf, if a state official seized
evidence in violation of the fourteenth amendment, the federal courts
should have refused to admit the tainted evidence by the same principles
which excluded evidence obtained by federal officials in violation of the
fourth amendment. These implications were largely ignored, however,
44
by the federal judiciary.
Three of the circuits did perceive that Wolf had attenuated the

silver platter doctrine;" these decisions, however, were narrow holdings,
and at least one of the cases turned on the Gambino "constructive
participation" doctrine.4 6 As the Supreme Court later noted in Elkins
v. United States:4 "[Tjhe Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-

bia [was] alone in squarely holding 'that the Weeks and the Wolf
decisions, considered together, make all evidence obtained by unconstitutional search and seizure unacceptable in federal courts.' ",48
The Elkins case and its companion, Rios v. United States,49
43. Id. at 31-32.
44. See, e.g., Galleagos v. United States, 237 F.2d 694, 696-97 (10th Cir. 1956);
United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1956); Ford v. United States, 234 F.2d
835, 837 (6th Cir. 1956); Williams v. United States, 215 F.2d 695, 696 (9th Cir. 1954);
Burford v. United States, 214 F.2d 124, 125 (5th Cir. 1954).
45. See, e.g., Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958); United States
v. Benanti, 244 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 355 U.S. 96 (1957);
Jones v. United States, 217 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1954).
46. In United States v. Benanti, 244 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1957), state officials obtained
evidence linking defendant with illegal narcotics traffic by a telephone tap and, based
on this information, the police searched defendant's car. The search revealed no narcotics, but rather liquor which was without the required federal tax stamps. The liquor
was turned over to federal authorities, and defendant was convicted of violating federal
tax laws. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidence obtained through such a state wiretap
was inadmissible in a federal court, because disclosure of the information would violate
the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C § 605 (1953). 244 F.2d at 394.
47. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
48. Id. at 214, quoting Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
49. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
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presented the Court with an opportunity to address the questions raised
by Wolf in the silver platter area. 0 In Elkins, petitioners were indicted
for intercepting and divulging telephone conversations in violation of the
federal wiretapping laws. 51 On defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence, the trial judge assumed that the search by state officers which
uncovered the wiretapping paraphernalia was unreasonable and unconstitutional. The court refused to suppress the evidence, however, after
finding no federal participation in the illegal search and seizure. Petitioners were convicted and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,5" accepting the trial court's reasoning on the suppression issue.
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court ruled the evidence
inadmissible, holding that when Wolf was handed down, "the foundation upon which the admissibility of state-seized evidence in a federal
criminal trial originally rested . . . disappeared."' 3 'Reaffirming the
position in Wolf that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally founded, the Court based its holding on "the Court's supervisory power over
'5 4
the administration of justice in the federal courts.
The Court in Elkins thus moved to an evidentiary analysis in
balancing away the silver platter doctrine initiated in Weeks, reasoning
that considerations underlying the exclusion of evidence obtained illegally by state officers outweighed the need for the discovery of truth in
federal criminal trials. 55 If indeed Wolf conceptually undercut the
original foundation for silver platter evidence, the decision in Elkins
rested on the principles of judicial integrity established in Weeks." °
However, the Court in Elkins also adopted a more pragmatic basis for
the exclusionary rule by emphasizing the deterrence rationale: "The rule
is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effective
way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."'57 The emphasis on
deterrence in Elkins indicated that no distinction should be drawn
.50. The Court had denied certiorari in two other silver platter cases only a year
before it agreed to decide Elkins and Rios. See Gaitan v. United States, 252 F.2d
256 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 937 (1958); Costello v. United States, 255 F.2d
389 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958).
51. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 501, 605 (1954); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1948).
.52. 266 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
53. 364 U.S. at 213.
54. Id. at 216, quoting from McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
See FED. R. CIM. P. 26.
55. 364 U.S.at 216.
56. Compare Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960) with Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914).
57. 364 U.S. at 217.
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between constitutional violations by state or federal officers in determining whether the purposes of the exclusionary rule will be served.
One year later, in Mapp v. Ohio,58 the Court held the exclusionary
remedy mandatory on the state courts by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment; thus the discretion left to the states by Wolf was removed.
Even so, the Mapp Court reiterated the dual policy bases for the
exclusionary rule; deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct and the

maintenance of judicial integrity.59
In cases since Mapp, the historical emphasis by the Court on
principles of judicial integrity has been subordinated in deference to the

deterrence rationale.

Moreover, the primary focus on deterrence in

recent cases has resulted in several limitations on the scope of the

exclusionary rule in certain collateral or fringe areas. 60 For example,
the Supreme Court refused to accord retroactivity to Mapp and its
progeny on the basis that deterrence would not be furthered. 6 ' Furthermore, in Calandra v. United States,62 the Court failed to mention
judicial integrity, relying exclusively on the deterrence rationale in ex-

empting grand jury proceedings from the operation of the rule.63 The
58. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
59. Id. at 656, 659-60.
60. See note 2 supra. Two of the more notable areas in which the Supreme Court
has restricted the scope of the exclusionary rule have included cases on impeachment
and standing. In Walder v. United States, 374 U.S. 62 (1954), the Court permitted
illegally seized heroin to be used to impeach the defendant's credibility after the defendant had testified that he had never possessed narcotics. See also Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971). Furthermore, in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1967),
the Court held that the "suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation
can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself,
not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence." 394
U.S. at 171-72. Justice White reasoned that society's interest in discovering the truth
in a criminal trial outweighed any deterrent effect the exclusionary rule might otherwise have if extended to individuals whose rights had not been violated. Id. at 175.
However, the authority of Alderman as support for -the Court's deterrence analysis
in deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule proves to be of dubious validity upon
close examination. It should be noted that the standing decision in Alderman rested
on the Court's refusal to extend the fourth amendment to certain individuals and therefore had no relevance to the issue of whether the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule would be served.
61. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965).
62. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
63. The limitations recently placed on the exclusionary rule may be attributed to
the attenuation doctrine now employed by the Court in balancing the efficacy of the
rule in a specific situation. As Justice Powell, concurring in Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590 (1975), has explained:
[Uln some circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforcement
than can be justified by the rule's deterrent purposes. The notion of the "dissi-
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evidentiary analysis expressed in Elkins has also become prevalent in

recent years, resulting in an analysis of the rule's purposes with close
attention to the factual context of each case.

Yet until Janis, this

balancing approach had never been employed by the Court to permit the
direct use of tainted evidence in the government's case in chief.
III.

THE

JANIS ANALYSIS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Notwithstanding the narrow issue presented in the Janis decision, 4
the Supreme Court's analysis represents a potentially far-reaching departure from the underlying principles of Weeks, Elkins, and Mapp. By

reaffirming the nonexistence of a constitutional basis for the exclusionary rule, the Court has clearly divorced the right to freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, as expressed in the fourth amend-

ment, from the remedy of exclusion."

This distinction suggests that the

conceptual basis for the rule lies solely within the Supreme Court's
supervisory powers; powers which traditionally have extended only to
the federal courts. 6
The Court in Janis, however, further rejected the notion that a

supervisory basis for the rule places per se limitations on the courts in
the form of principles of judicial integrity. Relying on recent restrictions on the exclusionary rule in collateral areas,6 7 the Court redefined

these principles in terms of whether suppression has a direct deterrent
effect on the law enforcement community:
The primary meaning of "judicial integrity" in context
of evidentiary rules is that the court must not commit or enpation of the taint" attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.
Id. at 608-09.
64. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
65. The distinction between right and remedy in the fourth amendment area marks
a rejection of the constitutional language in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and
reaffirms the foundation for the exclusionary rule expressed in United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531 (1975) and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). As Justice
Powell stated in Calandra:
[T]he rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.
. .. As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.
414 U.S. at 348, quoted in United States v. Janis, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3028-29 (1976).
66. For an extended discussion of the Supreme Court's supervisory powers over the
federal courts, see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31-34 (1963); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
67. See notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text.
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courage violations of the Constitution. In the Fourth Amendment area, however, the evidence is unquestionably accurate
and the violation is complete by the time the evidence is presented to the court. . . . The focus therefore must be on the
question whether the admission of the evidence encourages
violations of Fourth Amendment rights.6s
The Court has therefore considered the twin goals of the rule-deterrence and judicial integrity-and subordinated the latter to the
former, thereby effecting a fundamental shift in focus from the courts to
the police. However, the shift in emphasis may well have gone too far,
as the language in Janis concerning judicial integrity indicates. If
indeed these principles have any continued vitality in admonishing the
courts not to "commit or encourage" violations of the fourth amendment, then it is difficult to understand why the Court's analysis did not
focus on the defective search warrant issued by the state court in Janis.69
When a state or federal magistrate issues a warrant which does not meet
the requirements of Spinelli v. United States,7" the fourth amendment
violation is, in effect, committed by the judicial process. In this instance, admission of the tainted evidence will tend to discourage strict
adherence by state and federal magistrates to the constitutional requirements of probable cause. The failure of the Court in Janis to provide
sanctions on the warrant-issuing state court may indicate that the principles of judicial integrity have been completely eliminated. 71
In any event, the redefinition of judicial integrity in Janis indicates
that the Court is no longer focusing on whether the federal courts should
be automatically prohibited from participating in the fruits of unconstitutional searches and seizures. Instead the Court has moved to a lessrestrictive evidentiary standard which measures the degree of deterrence
that exclusion will exert on future police conduct. In this context, Janis
makes clear that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment
68. 96 S. Ct. at 3034 n.35.
69. The search warrant in Janis was issued by a judge of the Municipal Court of
the Los Angeles Judicial District. 96 S. Ct. at 3023.
70. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See note 12 supra and accompanying text. See also
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
71. But see Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976). In Stone, the Court emphasized
that the lower courts must remain ever "concerned with preserving the integrity of the
judicial process." Id. at 3047. The Court in Stone apparently felt that the principles
of judicial integrity must be balanced with the severity or substance of the constitutional
violation. As the Court stated in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538 (1975),
these principles are "not offended if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in
good faith that their conduct was in accordance with the law." See notes 113-135 infra
and accompanying text,
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will be excluded only where the resultant deterrent effect outweighs the
societal costs incurred by suppressing otherwise probative evidence. 2
The difficulty which the lower courts will have in applying the
emerging case-by-case analysis in the fourth amendment area is accentuated by the multiplicity of factors involved in determining the rule's

deterrent effect in a given factual setting. 73 Indeed the Supreme Court
has consistently recognized a paucity of accurate empirical data concerning the rule's efficacy, 74 and has seemed to accept the proposition that
studies on deterrence are generally impossible to validate. 75 Neverthe72. 96 S. Ct. at 3032. See Stone v. Powell, 96 S. CL 3037, 3048-49 (1976), where
the Court traced the emergence of the balancing analysis in the fourth amendment area.
In defining the social costs imposed by excluding unconstitutionally obtained evidence
in criminal trials, emphasis has been typically placed on the fact that exclusion detracts
from the factfinding process and often permits the guilty criminal to remain at large
in society. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3050 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416-19 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 429
(1974); Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 378, 388-91 (1964). The Court in Janis, however, failed to note that these costs
are substantially less when tainted evidence is excluded in a civil tax proceeding under
the federal wagering tax laws. See Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792, 805 (1972).
Admittedly, exclusion of evidence in a Janis-type situation will inhibit the discovery
of truth in tax litigation; yet in Janis, the evidence had been previously excluded in
the state criminal trial. As a result, the social costs incurred by suppression in the
federal tax proceeding would have only included the loss of taxable revenue to the federal treasury. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Tanis, recognized the anomaly of excluding
illegally seized evidence in criminal trials while, on the basis of similar reasoning, admitting that same evidence in tax assessments under the wagering revenue laws:
[U]nder the Court's ruling [in Janis], society must not only continue to pay
the high cost of the exclusionary rule (by foregoing criminal convictions which
can be obtained only on the basis of illegally seized evidence) but it must
also forfeit the benefit for which it has paid so dearly.
96 S. Ct. at 3036 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Moreover, if the wagering tax provisions
in Janis are viewed as criminal sanctions to be imposed for illegal conduct, then the
deterrence rationale would be substantially furthered by exclusion. Id.
73. See generally Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule
and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. L.Q. 621; Kaplan, The Limits of the Exchsionary
Rule, 26 S-rAr. L. REv. 1027 (1974); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REv. 736 (1972); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 (1970).
74. See, e.g., Janis v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3030-32 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3051 & n.32 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
348 n.5 (1974); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
75. See 96 S. Ct. at 3030 n.22. Further support for the proposition in text may
be found in the JanisCourt's extensive quotation of language in Elkins:
Empirical statistics are not available to show that the inhabitants of states
which follow the exclusionary rule suffer less from lawless searches and
seizures than do those of states which admit evidence unlawfully obtained.
Since as a practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative, it is hardly
likely that conclusive factual data could ever be assembled. For much the
same reason, it cannot positively be demonstrated that enforcement of the
criminal law is either more or less effective under either rule.
Id. at 3032, quoting from Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960) (emphasis
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less, the Court in Janis initiated a touchstone for the lower courts by
assuming the continued substantial efficacy of the rule in strictly
criminal proceedings. 76 Furthermore, in Stone v. Powell,77 the companion case to Janis, the Court acknowledged the deterrent value of the
exclusionary rule as an educative device over the long term:
Despite the absence of supportive empirical evidence, we
have assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard
it. More importantly, over the long term this demonstration
that our society attaches serious consequences to violations
of constitutional rights is thought to encourage those who
formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate
Fourth Amendment ideals into
78
their value systems.
By assuming that substantial deterrence results from exclusion in
criminal proceedings, the Court in Janis posited two rather broad rules
of attenuation which, at least in their totality, effectively reduce the
deterrence rationale. If, as the Janis holding seems to suggest, the
existence of intersovereign violations in federal civil proceedings was the
crucial factor in the Court's balancing analysis, future application of the
rule may depend strictly on the nature of the proceeding and the law
enforcement officers involved. 79 However, to the extent that the good
faith reliance by the police on the defective search warrant in Janis was
necessary to the holding, application of the rule may depend on the
substance of the constitutional violation. 0

A. THE NATURE

OF THE LITIGATION, INTERSOVEREIGN

VIOLATIONS AND DETERRENCE

While the Janisrationale provides support for the continued application of the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings,"' there remains
some question of the rule's applicability in civil proceedings involving
intrasovereign violations.8 " The Court in Janis was careful not to
added). However, the Janis Court was careful not to rule out the possibility that valid
statistical data may be assembled in the future. See 96 S. Ct. at 3031 n.26,
76. 96 S. Ct. at 3029.
77. 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
78. Id. at 3051 (footnotes omitted).
79. See notes 81-112 infra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 1,13-135 infra and accompanying text.
81. See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text.
82. The term "civil proceedings" as used in this comment, refers generally to civil-
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explicitly address this issue, refusing only to extend the rule to civil tax
However, arguments
proceedings involving intersovereign violations.

for the rule's application to intrasovereign civil proceedings must now
assume, on the apparent authority of Janis, that intersovereign violations
significantly diminish the deterrent effect of the rule.
With the possible exception of Janis, the Supreme Court has never
restricted the fourth amendment or the exclusionary rule to the formal
confines of the criminal process. 8 3 Indeed, the Court has consistently

invoked the rule of Weeks and Mapp in civil proceedings with criminal
overtones or which involve a sufficient nexus to the violation of criminal
laws. 4 As early as 1886, in Boyd v. United States,8" the Court applied
the rule in a federal forfeiture proceeding, reasoning that the fourth

amendment's limitations on unreasonable governmental intrusion should
not be wholly contingent on the form of the litigation in which the
tainted evidence is offered. More recently, a unanimous Court in One
8 reiterated the reasoning in
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania"
Boyd by holding that evidence obtained unconstitutionally is inadmissible in state forfeiture proceedings.8 7 Viewed together, these two deci-

sions indicate that the exclusionary rule should apply to proceedings in
which the purposes are analogous to the objectives sought by criminal
type proceedings which are not strictly criminal in nature but which are initiated by
the federal government. See United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3032-33 (1976).
It seems fairly settled that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in purely civil proceedings in which the government has no direct interest, at least where the fourth amendment violations are not committed by state agents. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465 (1927); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 203 N.E.2d
481 (1964); Diener v. Mid-American Coaches, Inc., 378 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. 1964). Contra, Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 2d 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (1966).
83. Unlike the fifth amendment, the fourth amendment makes no distinction between unreasonable searches and seizures in the criminal context and those in the civil
context. Compare U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV with U.S. CONST. amend. V. Indeed this
distinction has prompted the Tax Court to apply the fourth amendment to civil tax
proceedings, while refusing to apply the fifth amendment to proceedings which are not
criminal in nature. Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792, 805 (1972).
84. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (fourth amendment
barred prosecution of one refusing to permit warrantless search of private residence
pursuant to housing code); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (extended principle in Camara to commercial establishments); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) (state forfeiture proceedings); Boyd v. United Sates, 716
U.S. '616 (1886) (federal forfeiture proceedings). See also Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217, 254-55 (1959) (Brennan, J.,dissenting). For a discussion suggesting that
One 1958 Plymouth and Camaraexerted a liberalizing effect on the exclusionary rule,
see Note, The FourthAmendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future, 53 VA. L. REv.
1314, 1319-23 (1967).
85. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
86. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
87. Id, at 702.
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prosecution and conviction. As Justice Bradley stated in Boyd:
If the government prosecutor elects to waive an indictment,
and to file a civil information against the claimants-that is,
civil in form-can he by this device take from the proceeding
its criminal aspect and deprive the claimants of their immunities as citizens . . . . This cannot be. The information,
though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal one. . . . As, therefore, suits for penalties
and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses
against the law, are of this quasi criminal nature, we think

that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for
88
all the purposes of the fourth amendment ....

The characterization in Boyd and One 1958 Plymouth of some

civil proceedings as quasi-criminal for fourth amendment purposes has
prompted the federal courts to invoke the rule in a variety of intrasover-

eign civil proceedings, 89 including civil tax proceedings under the federal wagering tax laws.9"

The Court in Janis, however, failed to discuss

the criminal implications of the civil tax assessment with which it was
presented. 91 Instead, the Court broadly distinguished the lower federal
decisions on the sole basis of the intersovereign violation which occurred

in Janis.2 Implicit in this distinction is the assumption that police
88. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886) (emphasis in original).
89. See, e.g., Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (administrative agency hearing involving cease and desist order for violating Robinson-Patman
Act); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (military discharge proceedings); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968),
a!f'd sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (state antitrust action wherein court characterized treble damage actions as quasi-criminal). For
an example of a state court relying on One 1958 Plymouth, see People v. Moore, 69
Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968), where the California Supreme
Court applied the exclusionary rule in a civil narcotics addict commitment proceeding,
stating: "Whatever the label that may be attached to those proceedings, it is apparent
that there is a close identity to the aims and objectives of criminal law enforcement
." 69 Cal. 2d at -, 446 P.2d at 805, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 805 (citations omitted).
90. See Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1969); Berkowitz v.
United States, 340 F.2d 168 (1st Cir. 1965); United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp.
180 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
91. This failure indicates that the Court characterized the civil tax proceeding in
Janis as civil in nature for purposes of the exclusionary rule. Support for this proposition may be taken from the fact that the Court cited with approval the quasi-criminal
standard established in One 1958 Plymouth and Boyd, yet made no attempt to extend
this standard to the issue in Janis. See United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3029
& n.17 (1976). The implicit refusal of the Court to characterize the tax assessment
in Janis as quasi-criminal may indicate that One 1958 Plymouth and Boyd are to be
strictly limited to their facts.
92. 96 S. Ct. at 3032-33. In this regard, the question arises whether the Janis
Court, by distinguishing the federal intrasovereign decisions, was citing them with approval. The Court's preoccupation with the intersovereign distinction implies that this
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officials are only sufficiently interested in proceedings involving the

sovereign of which they are agents.

Aside from the validity of this

assumption, however, its effect seems to resurrect the silver platter

doctrine in federal proceedings which are not strictly criminal in both
nature and form.
The view that intersovereign fourth amendment violations substan-

tially reduce the deterrent efficacy of the exclusionary rule in civil tax
proceedings ignores the policy considerations which led the Court in
Elkins to reject the silver platter exception in criminal areas. The

intrasovereign-intersovereign distinction seems at odds with the Supreme
Court's recurring recognition in previous cases that cooperation often
exists between state and federal law enforcement officials.93 Indeed,
examples of state and local assistance to the Internal Revenue Service

are replete in the federal tax case law. 4 Moreover, the silver platter
exception to the exclusionary rule in Janisre-establishes the need for en-

forcement of the "federal participation" doctrines enunciated in Byars
and Gambino."s
These doctrines have become obsolete under the rule in Elkins
where evidence obtained unconstitutionally is excluded in federal criminal trials whether the violation is committed by state or federal officers.
may have been the case. This argument, however, assumes that the Supreme Court
would extend the quasi-criminal standards in One 1958 Plymouth and Boyd to intrasovereign civil tax proceedings. See notes 101-112 infra and accompanying text. But
see note 89 supra.
93. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 211 (1960); Gambino v. United
States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 31 (1926); notes 3036 supra and accompanying text.
94. See Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 584 n.6 (2d Cir. 1969); Anderson
v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 363, 365 (S.D. Fla. 1973). See generally Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion in Janis, acknowledged the realities of
federal tax enforcement by arguing that state and federal law enforcement officers frequently provide the IRS with information obtained in criminal investigations which tend
to prove violations of the federal wagering tax laws. United States v. Janis, 96 S.
Ct. 3021, 3035-36 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart supported his arguments by citing to Marchetti and by referring to the deposition of one of the arresting
state officers in Janis. The statements of the police officer, reproduced in Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, suggest that the larger the bookmaking or gambling arrest or
investigation, the more likely that state cooperation and assistance to federal revenue
agents will occur. 96 S. Ct. at 3036 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
95. See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that before
the silver platter doctrine was overruled in Elkins, the federal exclusionary rule in Weeks
forced the federal courts to police the cooperation which commonly existed between
state and federal officials. See Marron v. United States, 8 F.2d 251, 259 (9th Cir.
1925); United States v. Brown, 8 F.2d 630, 631 (D. Ore. 1925). Without the enforcement of the participation doctrines, federal officials could circumvent the federal rule
by directing state and local officials to obtain needed evidence through illegal means.
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In proceedings which are not strictly criminal, however, the reemergence
of the participation doctrines imposes on the federal courts the difficult

task of adjudicating the extent of federal involvement in state searches
96

and seizures in virtually every instance where timely objection is made.
Given the participation doctrines established in Byars and Gambino,
the intersovereign exception in Janis will no doubt encourage covert and
unobtrusive methods of cooperation between state and federal police
officers. The Court in Elkins summarized the problems of the intersov-

ereign distinction in this regard:
Free and open cooperation between state and federal
law enforcement officers is to be commended and encour-

aged. Yet that kind of cooperation is hardly promoted by
a rule that implicitly invites federal officers to withdraw from

such association and at least tacitly to encourage state officers
in the disregard of constitutionally protected freedom. If, on
the other hand, it is understood that the fruit of an unlawful
search by state agents will be inadmissible in a federal trial,
there can be no inducement to subterfuge and evasion with
respect to federal-state cooperation in criminal investigation.
Instead, forthright cooperation under constitutional standards
will be promoted and fostered9T

Apart from the problems of federal-state cooperation, the real
tension between Janis and Elkins derives from their opposing assumptions regarding the interest which state officials have in federal proceedings. Contrary to the implications of Janis, the overruling of the silver
platter doctrine in Elkins was founded on the assumption that state

police officers have a substantial interest in the conviction of criminals
they assist in apprehending, whether the conviction is obtained in
96. The Supreme Court in Elkins noted the difficulties which the lower federal
courts had prior to the overruling of the silver platter doctrine in criminal proceedings
in determining whether federal participation had occurred in unlawful state searches
and seizures. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 212 (1960). Regarding issues
of overt federal particpation, the federal courts not only reached varying results, but
were internally inconsistent in their decisions as well. Compare United States v. Butler,
156 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1946); Ward v. United States, 96 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1938);
Sutherland v. United States, 92 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1937); Fowler v. United States,
62 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1932) with Kitt v. United States, 132 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1942);
Sloane v. United States, 47 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1931). In addition, the federal courts
experienced no less difficulty in determining whether, absent the actual and overt federal
participation prohibited in Byars, a state search and seizure consisted of the "constructive participation" prohibited in Gambino. Compare Marsh v. United States, 29 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1928); United States v. Jankowski, 28 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1928) with
United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1946).
97. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221-22 (1960), quoted in Janis v. United
States, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 2036 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 657-58 (1961).
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state or federal court.9 8 The fact that the Court in Janis acknowledged

the Elkins assumption in criminal proceedings, however, indicates that
the two decisions are reconcilable.9 9 But unless the import of Elkins is

to be severely restricted, the broad principle which must be gleaned
from Janis is that as the nature of the proceeding in question moves
towards the criminal area, the outcome-interest assumption in Elkins

increases in viability. 10

In other words, as the type of proceeding

becomes more criminal in nature, the interest of state officers in the
outcome, and therefore the deterrent efficacy of the rule, increases

proportionately.
Under this analysis, unlike that of the Janis majority, the cogency
of the intersovereign exception is dependent on a proper characterization of the litigation. Viewed in terms of the Court's deterrence ration-

ale, the issue becomes whether the exclusionary rule should obtain in a
particular proceeding involving intrasovereign fourth amendment violations. 1' 1 Where the proceeding is sufficiently quasi-criminal to warrant
the application of the exclusionary rule, as in the federal forfeiture in
Boyd, the- outcome-interest assumption in Elkins should preclude the

attenuation of deterrence when intersovereign violations are involved.
The foregoing analysis actually suggests that the intersovereign

distinction should not exist in the federal courts; rather, when evidence
improperly obtained by federal officers is excluded, the result should
also extend to violations by state officers. The theory is that federal law
enforcement officers should not be able to accomplish through state and
local police what they are prohibited from doing themselves. 10 2 To
98. Compare Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) with United States v.
Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976). This assumption seems especially true after Janis, wherein
the Court reaffirmed the Elkins holding exclusively in terms of the deterrence rationale.
96 S. Ct. at 3029.
99. See note 98 supra.
100. Although this conclusion is supportable from the Court's reaffirmance of Elkins
in Janis, note 96 supra, it establishes the precise point of disagreement between the
majority opinion in Janis and Justice Stewart's dissent. The real issue which divided
the Court in Janis concerned the point at which the outcome-interest assumption in
Elkins obtains sufficiently to preclude the admission of silver platter evidence in the
federal courts. The Janis majority held in effect that the Elkins assumption is only
viable in criminal proceedings, while Justice Stewart gave Elkins a much broader reading. The distinction indicates that the majority refused to characterize the Janis tax
assessment as quasi-criminal in nature, while this was the major import of Justice Stewart's dissent. See notes 105-112 infra and accompanying text.
.101. See cases cited in notes 89 and 90 supra.
102. The proposition that Janis established a silver platter doctrine in federal noncriminal proceedings assumes that, had federal agents participated in or committed the
constitutional violations, the tainted evidence, and any fruits thereof, would have been
excluded. In other words, the various arguments criticizing the use of silver platter
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determine in a given instance whether the deterrence resulting from
exclusion will outweigh the resultant social costs, the courts should
analyze the true nature of the litigation. The Court in Janis was
unresponsive to this issue, however, implying that all federal proceed-

ings not strictly criminal are civil in nature for purposes of deterrence. 10 3
This implication not only ignores the characterization process anevidence are significant only if the federal courts distinguish between intersovereign and
intrasovereignfourth amendment violations by admitting evidence obtained by the former but not the latter. For this reason, the Court in Janis remanded the case for
a determination of whether federal agents had participated in the illegal search and
seizure. 96 S. Ct. at 3033 & n.31. Should federal participation be proven by the defendant on remand, the intrasovereignissue would be presented on appeal. Id.
Aside from the crucial distinction between intersovereign and intrasovereign fourth
amendment violations, the admission of the silver platter evidence in Tanis raises fundamental questions involving federalism and the regard of the federal courts for legitimate
state policies. See Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence
in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083, 1159-61 (1959). These questions
are especially important if the Supreme Court's recent rejections of the constitutional
language in Mapp signify a return to the Wolf era; an era during which states were
permitted to adopt their own methods of enforcing the right to privacy values in the
fourth amendment. Compare United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In these circumstances, states which have
elected to adopt the exclusionary rule would have their policies of enforcing the fourth
amendment thwarted by the admission of silver platter evidence in the federal courts.
See Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and
Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1160-61 (1959); Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self Incrimination, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 346, 363, 368
(1957); Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties,
45 ILL. L. Rav. 1, 23 (1950).
In this regard, concern for a "healthy federalism" prompted the Supreme Court
in Elkins to criticize the silver platter doctrine in terms of respect for state exclusionary
policies:
[W]hen a federal court sitting in an exclusionary state admits evidence lawlessly seized by state agents, it not only frustrates state policy, but frustrates
that policy in a particularly inappropriate and ironic way. For by admitting
the unlawfully seized evidence the federal court serves to defeat the state's
effort to assure obedience to the Fedral Constitution. In states which have
not adopted the exclusionary rule, on the other hand, it would work no conflict with local policy for a federal court to decline to receive evidence unlawfully seized by state officers.
364 U.S. at 221. As the Elk-ins language suggests, the admission of the silver platter
evidence in the federal tax proceeding in Janis effectively frustrated the California policy
of exclusion expressed in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). In
contrast, the Supreme Court in Elkins explicitly sought to preserve respect for the California policy in Cahan by rejecting the intersovereign distinction in federal criminal
proceedings. See 364 U.S. at 220-21. Any supposed distinction between the types of
the proceedings in Janis and Elkins should not warrant the inconsistent treatment of
state policy. See notes 105-111 infra and accompanying text.
103. This contention, however, is dependent on whether the Court in Janis indicated
approval of the holdings in One 1958 Plymouth and Boyd. See note 91 supra. To
the extent that these holdings were affirmed in dictum, the Court carved out an exception to the statement in text in the case of forfeitures of property used in violation
of the criminal law ,
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nounced in One 1958 Plymouth and Boyd, but it also fails to properly
04
analyze the nature of the tax assessment in Janis."

Though the Court's decision in One 1958 Plymouth involved the

nature of forfeiture proceedings, its rationale indicates that a civil-type
action should be considered criminal for fourth amendment purposes
when "[i]ts object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the

commission of an offense against the law."'10 5 Some questions may be
raised, however, concerning the authority of One 1958 Plymouth on the

Janisissue. The argument can be made that the real issue in One 1958
Plymouth was whether the right in the fourth and fourteenth amend-

ments should be extended to forfeitures, and not whether the remedy of
exclusion should apply assuming the right had been violated.' 00

This argument assumes that the Court in One 1958 Plymouth
relied on the constitutional principles in Mapp and therefore predated
the Court's shift to deterrence as the primary basis for the exclusionary
rule.' 0 7 Despite the validity of this argument, the rationale in One 1958
Plymouth seems appropriate to the deterrence analysis now applied by
the Court in the fourth amendment area. According to this rationale,
the deterrent efficacy of the rule is substantial in federal proceedings
08
involving objectives analogous to those of the criminal process.1
By analogy to the forfeiture proceedings in One 1958 Plymouth
104. See notes 105-112 infra and accompanying text.
105. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965).
106. Compare One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) with
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
107. The argument demonstrates the confusion resulting in the fourth amendment
area after the Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Since Mapp
held the exclusionary remedy to be an "essential ingredient" of the fourth amendment,
id. at 651, the argument states that the issue in cases after Mapp actually concerned
whether the right in the fourth amendment had been violated. The implication of this
argument is that the exclusionary remedy after Mapp automatically followed a violation
of the right and was therefore contingent on the parameters of federal and state action.
See Burdean v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), where the Court held that the fourth
amendment provides limitations on "the activities of sovereign authority." Id. at 475.
See generally Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
The decision in One 1958 Plymouth indicates, however, that even during the Mapp
era, the Court refused to hinge the application of the exclusionary rule purely on state
action concepts. Instead of focusing on whether sovereign authority was involved, the
Court in One 1958 Plymouth seemed more concerned with whether evidence unconstitutionally obtained should be excluded in proceedings which are not strictly criminal. See
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965). Thus, it may
be argued that One 1958 Plymouth limited the constitutional principles in Mapp to
criminal prosecutions and focused instead on the deterrence rationale in Elkins in deciding whether to invoke the rule in forfeitures. See United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp.
180, 182-83 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
108. See United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3036 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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and Boyd, the argument should be made that the assessment in Janis for
failure to pay federal wagering excise taxes was actually criminal in

nature. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that the wagering
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code of 195409 were intended not

only to raise revenue but to "assist the efforts of state and federal
authorities to enforce [criminal] penalties" for illegal gambling activities. 110 Undoubtedly Justice Stewart, dissenting in Janis, was correct in

describing the gambling enforcement process as "one of mutual cooperation and coordination, with the federal wagering tax provisions buttressing state and federal criminal sanctions." ' 1
Perhaps the ultimate issue in the analogy is the extent to which the

objectives in civil tax proceedings must approximate criminal objectives.
The Court in One 1958 Plymouth and Boyd seemed to focus on whether

the sanctions involved were penal in character. Indeed, at least one
federal court relying on this analysis has concluded that a civil proceeding under the federal wagering tax laws imposes "onerous monetary

penalties" and requires a determination that the criminal laws have been
violated."

2

Any attempt to restrict the quasi-criminal standard to a

requirement of both penal sanctions and criminal procedures should be
limited, since this requirement would involve an element not appropriate
to the deterrence rationale. Whether a police officer is interested in the

outcome of a proceeding should not depend on whether it is criminal in
form. Rather, the deterrent efficacy of the rule should be contingent on

whether the civil proceeding imposes sanctions commensurate with those
of the criminal process.
If the analysis is correct in concluding that federal officers have a

substantial interest in civil tax proceedings under the federal wagering
109. I.R.C. § 4401 (1974) (excise taxes); I.R.C. § 4411 (1974) (occupational
taxes); I.R.C. § 4412 (registration taxes).
110. United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3035 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(brackets in original), quoting from Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 47 (1968).
As the Court noted in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), the legislative
history to the federal wagering tax laws at least suggests that the provisions were intended to deter criminal gambling activities. Id. at 27. See 97 Cong. Rec. 6892 (1951).
111. 96 S.Ct. at 3035-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
112. See United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180, 182, 184 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
In applying the quasi-criminal standard in One 1958 Plymouth and Boyd to civil tax
proceedings under the federal wagering tax laws, the court in Blank stated:
Where, as here, there is a correlative civil action open to the Government
which imposes a penalty upon the citizen commensurate with the criminal
sanctions to which an accused . . .would be exposed, then we see no distinguishable difference between the two forms of punishment which excuses the
government from complying with constitutional mandates when prosecuting
their action in a civil forum.
Id. at 182.
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tax laws, the assumption in Elkins should also apply to state officers.
This proposition is supported by the realities of federal-state enforcement of the criminal gambling laws. By focusing on the specific nature
of the civil tax proceeding in Janis, the analysis demonstrates that the
apparent holding of the Court is of questionable validity. These conclusions tend to reinforce the argument that the Court in Janis was heavily
influenced by the good faith efforts of the police.
B.

GOOD FAITH

RELIANCE ON A DEFECTIVE SEARCH

WARRANT AND DETERRENCE

Admission of the suspect evidence in Janis was predicated primarily upon the belief that evidentiary exclusion would not further the
deterrence of unlawful police conduct under the facts of the case.113 The
majority, however, noted as a further reason for admitting the evidence
the fact that the police officers acted under a good faith belief that they
4
were in compliance with the mandates of the fourth ameiidment."
This consideration of a good faith factor has appeared in several recent
Supreme Court decisions."1 5
The effect of the presence of good faith was noted by the Court in
Michigan v. Tucker:" 6 "Where the official action was pursued in
complete good faith .

. .

. the deterrence rationale loses much of its

force. 11 7 Superficially viewed, this argument has much appeal;
"[e]xclusion should surely not be demanded where the officer did not
know and had no reason to know that in some minor technicality he was
violating the rule."118 However, an exception carved out of the exclusionary rule for good faith violations of the fourth amendment would
create a host of new difficulties. Indeed, if the application of such a
standard is carried to its logical end, the result would be the virtual
overruling of a line of cases extending from 1886 to the present.'"
Furthermore, a good faith test could easily be carried over into the fifth
120
amendment area and vitiate current standards there as well.
113. 96 S. Ct. at 3029.
114. Id. at 3034, n.35.

115. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
116. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
117. Id. at 447.

118. Bator and Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and Possible Legislative
Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 62, 76 (1966).
119. The fact that the illegally obtained evidence was excluded at Janis' criminal
trial and that this result was not questioned by the Supreme Court in lanis demonstrates
that the rule in Elkins is still applicable.
120, -Yee Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
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Initially, it must be noted that the Supreme Court has not yet
squarely upheld the admission of evidence solely upon a finding of good
faith,1 2 ' and therefore any practical standards in this area are not clearly
defined. Neither has the Court precisely indicated the weight that the
presence of good faith is to have in the Janis balancing analysis. As a
result, lower courts are left without a clear delineation of the contours of
the good faith standard which would lead to an orderly and consistent
application of the rules of law in the area. Reliance by lower courts on
the good faith standard in its present form 12 could well result in serious
confusion in the fourth amendment area, encourage police perjury, and
negate present constitutional protections.
In a situation where the police have failed to obtain a search
warrant, admission or exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment would turn not only upon the objective existence of
probable cause for the search, 1 23 but also upon the trial judge's evaluation of the police officer's subjective knowledge and state of mind at the
time of the search and seizure. As Professor Kamisar has noted: "The
notion that the judge can take into account whether the violation was
willful or not would be an exceedingly difficult task and it would seem
to put a premium on an untrained or relatively ignorant police department. They could just say they didn't know any better."' 24
The application of a good faith test by the trial judge would be
relatively simple in the case of a blatant and aggravated violation, such
as that in Mapp. 25 As in the application of most standards, however,
closer situations would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The
courts would be required to draw the line between good faith (evidentiary admission) and bad faith (evidentiary exclusion) by considering a
number of factors, such as the police officer's demeanor and credibility
121. At least one lower court has moved in this direction, however. See State v.
Grady, 153 Conn. 26, 28, 211 A.2d 675 (1965).
122. Although good faith is mentioned in text, the relegation of this test to a footnote
is an indication that the Court did not place serious reliance on it.
123. See note 128 infra and accompanying text.
124. 48 ALI Proceedings 376 (1971).
125. In Mapp, the police entered the defendant's house by use of force, refused to
allow defendant's attorney access to defendant, produced what was purportedly a search
warrant, and then refused to permit defendant to examine the "warrant." The officers
also seized defendant, twisted her arm, and handcuffed her "because she had been 'belligerent."' 367 U.S. at 644-45 (1961). For a discussion of standards which have been
proposed in this area, see Model Code of Pre-ArraignmnentProcedures § SS 290.2(2),
(Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1972). It should be noted, however, that a proposal
similar to the Model Code was incorporated in S. 2657, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972),
and was defeated 129 to 114 in the House of Representatives.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013

25

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 8
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:357

on the witness stand, his apparent level of intelligence, and perhaps his
actual knowledge of the technical requirements for a valid search and
seizure. It is certainly questionable at best to rely on this type of
subjective determination in the implementation of a constitutional guarantee. Moreover, because a finding of good faith by the trial judge
would be based upon factors which would not necessarily appear in the
record, a ruling on the issue would be difficult to attack through the
appellate process. 12 6 ,
In the situation where a police officer does go before a judicial
officer' 2 7 to obtain a search warrant, serious difficulties arise in the
attempt to apply a good faith standard. The test the magistrate must
apply to determine whether a search warrant should be issued is the
standard of probable cause.' 2 This standard requires that the affiant
present facts and circumstances within the scope of his knowledge which
are sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious person's belief in the
12 -9
truth of the underlying facts.
In Janis, the officers obtained their facts from an informant, rather
than through their own first hand observations. In this situation, a
more specific standard of probable cause applies-the two-pronged test
set forth in Spinelli v. United States.'
Once the magistrate has
weighed the facts and concluded that a search warrant should be issued,
the implementation of a search by the police is in good faith. In this
context, too, there is room for abuse. Given the fact that the police
officer wants to obtain a search warrant, it is to his advantage to present
the facts and circumstances to the magistrate in such a way that that
official will be convinced of the existence of probable cause. A good
faith test might well fail to uncover such a slanted presentation of the
facts, especially considering the difficulties which the courts have had in
applying the current objective standards.' 3 '
A related problem in the use of a good faith test arises in the situa126. Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF.
L. REv. 579, 583-84 (1968).
127. For convenience, the term "magistrate" will be used hereinafter to indicate any
judicial official with power to issue a search warrant.
128. This requirement is expressly stated in the fourth amendment. See note 70
supra.
129. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); .Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307 (1959); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
130. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1962). See generally Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause for
Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 958 (1969).
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tion where a search warrant has been sought and obtained. The Supreme
Court in Janis has subsumed the concept of good faith under the
13 2
concept of the deterrence of unconstitutional conduct by the police. '
This formulation ignores the presence of a third party, the magistrate
who issues the warrant. This judicial official is essentially a buffer
between the private citizen and the zealous law enforcement official. Mr.
Justice Jackson has noted: "[The protection of the fourth amendment]
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."'1 33 Thus the
magistrate occupies a critical position in the protection of a citizen's
constitutional rights; therefore, deterrence should focus not only
upon the police, but also upon the judicial officials who must decide
whether to issue a search warrant. A warrant proceeding is nonadversarial and often a magistrate is untrained in the law; he may not make
the effort to scrutinize the evidence closely.'3 4 A good faith standard
which is applicable solely to the police would fail to protect the citizen
from any lapse of good faith on the part of the magistrate.
Although the majority in Janis speaks of good faith in terms of
deterrence of unlawful police conduct, the Court did not totally discard
the concept of judicial integrity.13 1 It is clear that courts are still under
the constraints mandated by that concept. A magistrate who issues a
warrant in violation of the Spinelli standard also violates the fourth
amendment standard of probable cause, and the evidence obtained
pursuant to that warrant should be excluded solely on grounds of
judicial integrity. Judicial integrity may be violated by a magistrate in
good faith; he may issue a warrant where there is insufficient probable
cause, and yet do so in the good faith belief that the affiant has supplied
facts sufficient to measure up to the constitutional standard. It is
arguable that the exclusion of the evidence obtained by the use of that
warrant would not deter the magistrate from committing further violations of the fourth amendment, because his error was made in good
faith. The evidence should still be excluded at any later criminal trial,
however, because of the violation of judicial integrity.
132. 96 S. Ct. at 3034, n.35.
133. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 1.3 (1948).
134. See TIFFANY, McINTYRE & ROTENBERG, DETECTON OF CRIME 119 (1967).

In

the case of federal magistrates, this problem has been alleviated by the upgrading of

the standards for such officials in the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639
(1968).
135. 96 S. Ct. at 3034 n.35.
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The application of a good faith standard to magistrates would thus
tend to erode their position as a shield between the zealous policeman
and the citizen. The concept of judicial integrity is broader than the
concept of good faith, and the former is the appropriate standard to
apply to the courts. Where a warrant has not been obtained, good faith
should be no more than Janis has dictated; one consideration in a test
which balances the efficacy of deterrence of unconstitutional conduct by
the police against the cost to society of evidentiary exclusion.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Janis continued its assault on the exclusionary rule by further restricting the conceptual bases upon which the rule
has traditionally rested. By relying on an evidentiary balancing analysis, the decision indicates that the Court is moving to a rationale in the
fourth amendment area which focuses exclusively and quantitatively on
the deterrent effect the rule will have on future police conduct.
However, the subordination of the Weeks principles of judicial
integrity to the deterrence rationale in Janis raises certain questions to
which the Court has not given a definitive answer. Perhaps the most
immediate question concerns the effect this shift in focus will have on
state and federal magistrates in issuing search warrants under the guidelines of the fourth amendment. Although a defective search warrant
was issued by the state court in Janis, the Court made no attempt to
resolve these implications, leaving open the question of whether the
judicial integrity basis for the exclusionary rule has been completely
eliminated. The rejection of these principles in Janis may simply
indicate that the federal courts should only retain their integrity when
the deterrence rationale is substantial.
Although the Court has yet to determine precisely the degree of
deterrence resulting from exclusion in a specific factual situation, the
JanisCourt avoided a decision on this issue by engaging in what may be
termed an assumption analysis. By assuming that deterrence is substantial in strictly criminal proceedings, the Court proceeded to apply a
doctrine of attenuation to the facts in Janis. In a general sense, the
factors identified by the Court as attenuating the deterrence rationale
included the civil nature of the tax proceeding, the sovereign status of
the law enforcement officers committing the fourth amendment violation, and the good faith efforts of these officers in implementing the
defective search warrant. In what was apparently the primary holding
of the decision, the Court ruled that the social costs of exclusion
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outweighed any deterrent effect the exclusionary rule would have in
situations involving intersovereign fourth amendment violations in federal civil tax proceedings.
In view of the continued vitality of Elkins, the theory which must
be derived from the Janis holding is that tax assessments for violations
of the federal wagering tax laws are strictly civil in nature. The analysis
which shows that these proceedings should be treated as quasi-criminal
for purposes of deterrence reveals the dubious validity of the silver
platter exception in Janis. The question therefore remains concerning
the extent to which the silver platter doctrine has been rejuvenated in
federal proceedings which are not purely criminal in nature and form.
The analysis also suggests that the Court in Janis was perhaps
heavily influenced by the good faith reliance of the state police officers
in implementing the defective search warrant. As in Janis, however, the
Supreme Court has yet to explicitly base a decision in the fourth
amendment area on the substance of the constitutional violation.
Therefore many of the difficulties which attend the good faith standard
have not been specifically addressed. Because of these problems, as
well as the criticisms of the apparent silver platter rationale in Janis, the
federal courts should be hesitant to extend the decision substantially
beyond its facts.

Chris E. Hagberg
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